

Online Appendix 1 - Change in labor regulations for domestic workers and sample of letter sent by the tax authority to potential employers

Before Law 26.844 was enacted in April 2013, most of the work regulations of domestic workers were different from those of other wage employees. The workday limit was set at 12 hours (whereas other wage employees enjoyed an 8-hour limit per day and 48 hours per week, beyond which employers are required to pay overtime compensation); there was no mandated right to paid holidays, nor sick or maternity leave for domestic workers, and their minimum wage was set unilaterally by the Federal Government, usually at or below the Federal minimum wage (while in most sectors collective bargaining would set minimum wages above the Federal minimum). In addition social security contributions were a step function of the number of hours a domestic worker was hired for, as opposed to a percentage of the gross wage.

In case of termination without notice, domestic workers were entitled to half the severance payment compared to other wage employees (which amounts to one monthly salary per year of service). Moreover, the severance pay did not change if the domestic worker was hired off the books, whereas other wage employees are entitled to twice the regular severance pay if they can prove that they were unregistered. Finally, employers were not required to carry an occupational accident insurance policy.

Since the enactment of Law 26.844, domestic workers were entitled to the same workday limit as other wage employees, the same holidays, sick and maternity leave as other workers (the latter paid for by the Government rather than the employer), and the same severance pay in case of termination without notice. In addition, from October 2013 employers of domestic workers were required to carry an occupational accident insurance policy. Table [OA1.1](#) presents the labor regulations of domestic workers before and after the reform, and the labor regulations enjoyed by other wage employees.


Table OA1.1: Labor regulations by occupation and time

	Domestic workers before reform	Domestic workers after reform	Other workers
Minimum wage	Set by Government (Federal minimum or below)	Set by Government (Federal minimum or below)	Federal minimum or collective bargaining
Health and pension contributions	Fixed sum	Fixed sum	26.5% of gross salary
Maximum hours of work	12/day	8/day and 48/week	8/day and 48/week
Paid holidays per year	Minimum of 2 weeks only for live-in workers	Minimum of 2 weeks	Minimum of 2 weeks
Paid sick leave	Only for live-in workers	All workers	All workers
Paid maternity leave	No	Yes (paid by Government)	Yes (Paid by employer)
Accident insurance policy	Not required	Mandatory for each worker	Mandatory for each worker
Fines to employers for hiring off the books	Not specified	ARS 7500	25% of salary per month of employment plus ARS 7500
Severance payment in case of dismissal	1/2 monthly salary per year of work	1 monthly salary per year of work	1 monthly salary per year of work
Severance payment to unregistered workers	1/2 monthly salary per year of work	2 monthly salaries per year of work	2 monthly salaries per year of work

Note: The Table shows the main labor regulations to all workers except domestic workers (column 1), domestic workers before the reform took place (column 2) and the changes introduced by the reform (column 3). The reform to domestic worker's regulations took place in April 2013.

In addition to the stricter regulations, the tax authority (AFIP, for its Spanish acronym) started to send letters to individuals whom, based on their tax reports, were likely to employ a domestic worker although they were not paying social security contributions of behalf of one. Figure OA1.1, presents an example of such letters.

Figure OA1.1: Letter sent by the tax authority compelling potential employers to register a domestic worker



Note: The image

shows the letter that the tax authority (AFIP) sent to potential employers of domestic workers compelling them to register such employee. The letter specifies which laws and procedures contain the sanctions employers would face if they do not comply with the regulations.

Online Appendix 2 - Analysis starting the pre-treatment period in 2009

The following tables replicate the analysis presented in the paper, except that the pre-treatment period starts in 2009 instead of 2010. The year 2009 is excluded from the main analysis because during that year the Great Recession hit the Argentinean economy (when GDP fell by 6%). Because of the recession, workers whose wages are set through collective bargaining fell in real terms in 2009, but recovered in 2010, while those of domestic workers (which are set by the government) remained constant, hence creating pre-trend differences between affected and unaffected workers.

Table OA2.1: Summary statistics of domestic workers and other female workers

	Domestic workers	Low-wage service workers	Difference
Demographics			
Age	40.37	38.77	-1.596***
Share internal migrant	0.19	0.19	0.002
Share foreign migrant	0.08	0.05	-0.031***
Share married	0.45	0.47	0.017***
Household size	4.32	4.38	0.051*
Education			
Literacy	0.99	1.00	0.004***
Ever attended school	0.99	1.00	0.004***
Complete primary school (share)	0.90	0.95	0.053***
Complete secondary school (share)	0.30	0.43	0.133***
Complete higher education (share)	0.02	0.04	0.024***
Years of education	8.83	9.92	1.091***
Work			
Hours of work per week	24.70	34.82	10.119***
Monthly income (2008 ARS)	464.57	1074.43	609.857***
Hourly wage (2008 ARS)	5.82	8.23	2.408***
Tenure (months)	48.68	38.91	-9.773***
Pension contribution	0.15	0.60	0.449***
Health insurance contribution	0.15	0.61	0.466***
Has health insurance	0.42	0.72	0.299***
Observations	25714	14243	

Note: Mean refers to the mean of the variable for the corresponding group in the pre-reform period (2009-2012). The column Difference shows the difference in the variable mean in the pre-reform period between affected and comparison groups, with stars representing the statistical significance of the difference. Domestic workers refers to female respondents who identify themselves as domestic workers. Low-wage service workers refers to female wage workers in other low-wage service occupations.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA2.2: Estimates of the effect of the reform on observable characteristics

	Age (1)	Internal migrant (2)	Foreign migrant (3)	Household size (4)	Married (5)	Divorced (6)	Widow (7)	Literate (8)	Attended school (9)	Primary school (10)	Secondary school (11)	Tertiary school (12)	Years of education (13)
Domestic worker \times Reform	0.025 (0.019)	0.014 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.020)	0.025 (0.023)	0.023 (0.029)	0.011 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.015)	0.025 (0.019)	-0.027 (0.019)	0.005 (0.028)	0.000 (0.018)
Observations	65164	65164	65164	65164	65164	65164	65164	65164	65164	65164	65164	65164	65164
q-value	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Note: The table shows the difference-in-differences estimate for the standardized value of each characteristic. Internal and foreign migrant are indicators that take the value of one if the individual is an internal or foreign migrant, respectively. Married, divorced and widow are indicators that take the value of one if the respondent is married, divorced or widow, respectively. Attended school is an indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent ever attended school. Primary school, secondary school and tertiary education are indicators that takes the value of one if the respondent finished each level of education. The comparison group is composed of female wage worker in low-wage service occupations. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area (MA) level. Q-value correspond Hochberg's q-values that adjust for False Discovery Rate.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA2.3: Effect of policy reform on labor market outcomes of domestic workers

	Registered (1)	Unemployed (2)	Hours of work per week on main job (3)	Underemployment (4)	Income per month from main job (5)	Wage per hour from main job (6)
Domestic worker × Reform	0.043*** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.054*** (0.013)	0.003 (0.007)	0.017 (0.018)	0.071*** (0.016)
Mean dependent variable	0.153	0.0904	24.70	0.174	464.6	5.821
R-squared	0.318	0.092	0.199	0.088	0.434	0.312
Observations	65,164	71,757	65,164	65,164	65,164	65,164
q-value	0.002	0.921	0.000	0.921	0.921	0.000
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is unemployed. The dependent variable in column 3 is the natural logarithm of number of hours of work per week in the main job. In column 4, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent is willing to work more hours. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of income from the main job and the hourly wage from the main job, respectively. In all cases, the coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression.

The sample is composed of employed individuals, with the exception of column 2, where the sample includes all employed and unemployed individuals with a previous job. Domestic workers refers to female respondents who identify themselves as domestic workers. The comparison group is composed of female wage workers in low-wage service occupations. Means of dependent variable correspond to averages for the affected group in the pre-reform period. Controls include age, age squared, migrant status, household size, literacy status, years of education, years of education squared, marital status and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg's q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA2.4: Impact of domestic worker’s reform on labor market outcomes at the household level

	Labor force participation (1)	Share registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Labor income per month (4)
Domestic worker × Reform	-0.010 (0.006)	0.027** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.017)	0.018 (0.027)
Mean dependent variable	0.768	0.273	73.35	1642
R-squared	0.037	0.209	0.036	0.136
Observations	42,993	42,993	42,993	42,993
q-value	0.339	0.091	0.969	0.969
Controls	No	No	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32

Note: Dependent variable in column 1 is the share of individuals in the household of legal working age (16 and above) who are working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is the share of workers in the household who are registered by their employer and therefore work in the formal sector. The dependent variable in column 3 is natural logarithm of combined number of hours of work per week of all household members who are working. In column 4, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the combined labor income per month of all household members who are working. Coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. Domestic worker refers to household in which one member is a domestic worker. The sample includes all households in which there is a domestic worker or a woman employed in a low-wage occupation in the service sector who has a spouse and/or children of working age (16 and over). Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg’s q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA2.5: Summary statistics of male spouses

	Spouses of domestic workers	Spouses of female service workers	Difference
Demographics			
Age	45.32	43.96	-1.362***
Share internal migrant	0.23	0.25	0.029***
Share foreign migrant	0.08	0.05	-0.027***
Household size	4.33	4.32	-0.015
Has health insurance	0.51	0.69	0.182***
Education			
Literacy	0.99	1.00	0.007***
Ever attended school	0.99	1.00	0.004***
Complete primary school (share)	0.88	0.92	0.043***
Complete secondary school (share)	0.23	0.32	0.094***
Complete higher education (share)	0.02	0.04	0.023***
Years of education	8.30	9.17	0.869***
Work			
Labor force participation (share)	0.89	0.90	0.010*
Hours of work per week	46.89	46.56	-0.327
Monthly income (2008 ARS)	1522.20	1741.85	219.656***
Hourly wage (2008 ARS)	8.71	10.29	1.572***
Pension contribution	0.63	0.72	0.093***
Health insurance contribution	0.63	0.72	0.094***

Note: Mean refers to the mean of the variable for the corresponding group in the pre-reform period (2009-2012) for spouses in the sample. The column Difference shows the difference in the variable mean in the pre-reform period between affected and comparison groups, with stars representing the statistical significance of the difference. Spouses of domestic workers refers to male respondents married to or living with of domestic workers. Spouses of female service workers refers to male individuals married to or living with a wage worker in blue collar service occupations.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA2.6: Summary statistics of children

	Children of domestic workers	Children of female service workers	Difference
Demographics			
Age	17.78	17.82	0.039
Gender	0.50	0.50	0.003
Share internal migrant	0.07	0.07	0.007*
Share foreign migrant	0.02	0.01	-0.007***
Household size	5.53	5.36	-0.170***
Has health insurance	0.37	0.60	0.238***
Education			
Literacy	1.00	1.00	-0.001
Ever attended school	1.00	1.00	-0.000
Complete primary school (share)	0.89	0.90	0.011**
Complete secondary school (share)	0.46	0.50	0.039***
Years of education	9.29	9.45	0.170***
Work			
Labor force participation (share)	0.32	0.29	-0.027***
Hours of work per week	36.93	37.17	0.244
Monthly income (2008 ARS)	852.59	1002.44	149.85***
Hourly wage (2008 ARS)	6.20	7.09	0.897***
Pension contribution	0.30	0.38	0.081***
Health insurance contribution	0.30	0.39	0.089***

Note: Mean refers to the mean of the variable for the corresponding group in the pre-reform period (2009-2012) for children in the sample. The column Difference shows the difference in the variable mean in the pre-reform period between affected and comparison groups, with stars representing the statistical significance of the difference. Children of domestic workers refers to children whose mother is a domestic worker. Children of female service workers refers to whose mother is a wage worker in low-wage service occupations.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA2.7: Impact of domestic worker's reform on labor market outcomes of spouses and children

	Participation (1)	Registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Income per month (4)	Wage per hour (5)
<i>Panel A: Spouses</i>					
Spouse of Domestic worker × Reform	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.015)
Mean dependent variable	0.89	0.63	46.89	1522	8.71
R-squared	0.241	0.267	0.171	0.574	0.478
Observations	28,710	16,111	16,111	16,111	16,111
q-value	0.903	0.903	0.903	0.844	0.903
<i>Panel B: Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.031** (0.012)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.037 (0.023)	0.007 (0.025)	0.044** (0.019)
Mean dependent variable	0.455	0.304	36.93	852.6	6.197
R-squared	0.302	0.330	0.314	0.520	0.360
Observations	37,047	10,369	10,369	10,369	10,369
q-value	0.114	0.882	0.882	0.882	0.238
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. Dependent variables in columns 3 through 5 is the natural logarithm of hours of work in the main job, income from the main job, and the hourly wage from the main job, respectively. Coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. In Panel A, the sample includes all spouses of female domestic workers and those of female workers from other low-wage service occupations (column 1) and only those who are employed (columns 2 through 7). In Panel B, the sample includes all children of household heads aged 16 to 25 (column 1) and those who are employed (columns 2 through 5). Treated group corresponds to men (Panel A) and children (Panel B) whose spouse (mother) is a domestic worker. Comparison group correspond to men (Panel A) and children (Panel B) whose spouse (mother) is a worker in a low-wage service occupation. Mean dependent variables correspond to average for the affected group in the pre-reform period, and in the case of earnings they are expressed in Argentina Pesos of 2008. Controls include age, age squared, gender, household size, marital status, years of education of the household head, years of education of the household head squared, and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg's q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA2.8: Impact of domestic worker's reform on children's labor market outcomes

	Participation (1)	Registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Income per month (4)	Wage per hour (5)
<i>Panel A: All Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.031** (0.012)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.037 (0.023)	0.007 (0.025)	0.044** (0.019)
Mean dependent variable	0.455	0.304	36.93	852.6	6.197
R-squared	0.302	0.330	0.314	0.520	0.360
Observations	37,047	10,369	10,369	10,369	10,369
q-value	0.114	0.882	0.882	0.882	0.238
<i>Panel B: Female Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.039** (0.015)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.049 (0.045)	0.018 (0.045)	0.066* (0.039)
Mean dependent variable	0.345	0.277	29.44	665.1	6.149
R-squared	0.227	0.358	0.296	0.520	0.347
Observations	18,290	3,844	3,844	3,844	3,844
q-value	0.136	0.882	0.882	0.882	0.882
<i>Panel C: Male Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.031)	0.012 (0.041)	0.031 (0.028)
Mean dependent variable	0.564	0.319	41.56	966.2	6.212
R-squared	0.339	0.340	0.199	0.483	0.395
Observations	18,756	6,486	6,486	6,486	6,486
q-value	0.882	0.882	0.882	0.882	0.882
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. Dependent variables in columns 3 through 5 is the natural logarithm of hours of work in the main job, income from the main job, the hourly wage from the main job, income from all jobs, and total income, respectively. Coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. The sample includes all children of household heads aged 16 to 25 (column 1) and those who are employed (columns 2 through 5). Treated group corresponds to children whose mother is a domestic worker. Comparison group correspond to children whose mother is a worker in other low-wage service occupations. Mean dependent variables correspond to average for the affected group in the pre-reform period, and in the case of earnings they are expressed in Argentina Pesos of 2008. Controls include age, age squared, gender, household size, marital status, years of education of the household head, years of education of the household head squared, and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg's q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Online Appendix 3 - Estimates using quarterly data

The following tables replicate the results in Tables 2 to 5 of the paper when the data is used quarterly and treatment is set from the second quarter of 2013 onwards. In all cases the specification is the same as in the main analysis, except that I use year-by-quarter fixed effects instead of year fixed effects to control for unobserved shocks that may affect all workers in a given quarter.

Table OA3.1: Effect of policy reform on labor market outcomes of domestic workers

	Registered (1)	Unemployed (2)	Hours of work per week on main job (3)	Underemployment (4)	Income per month from main job (5)	Wage per hour from main job (6)
Domestic worker × Reform	0.047*** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.054*** (0.015)	0.003 (0.008)	0.035* (0.017)	0.089*** (0.016)
Mean dependent variable	0.158	0.0875	24.68	0.168	473.8	5.932
R-squared	0.315	0.094	0.201	0.087	0.434	0.308
Observations	54,963	60,394	54,963	54,963	54,963	54,963
q-value	0.001	0.695	0.002	0.695	0.128	0.000
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. The dependent variable in column 2 is the natural logarithm of number of hours of work per week in the main job. In column 3, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent is willing to work more hours. In columns 4 and 5, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of income from the main job and the hourly wage from the main job, respectively. In all cases, the coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression.

The sample is composed of employed individuals, with the exception of column 2, where the sample includes all employed and unemployed individuals with a previous job. Domestic workers refers to female respondents who identify themselves as domestic workers. The comparison group is composed of female wage workers in low-wage service occupations. Means of dependent variable correspond to averages for the affected group in the pre-reform period. Controls include age, age squared, migrant status, household size, literacy status, years of education, years of education squared, marital status and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg's q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA3.2: Impact of domestic worker’s reform on labor market outcomes at the household level

	Labor force participation (1)	Share registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Labor income per month (4)
Domestic worker × Reform	-0.008 (0.006)	0.029** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.017)	0.029 (0.026)
Mean dependent variable	0.766	0.276	73.74	1681
R-squared	0.038	0.208	0.036	0.134
Observations	36,194	36,194	36,194	36,194
q-value	0.525	0.060	0.696	0.525
Controls	No	No	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32

Note: Dependent variable in column 1 is the share of individuals in the household of legal working age (16 and above) who are working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is the share of workers in the household who are registered by their employer and therefore work in the formal sector. The dependent variable in column 3 is natural logarithm of combined number of hours of work per week of all household members who are working. In column 4, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the combined labor income per month of all household members who are working. Coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. Domestic worker refers to household in which one member is a domestic worker. The sample includes all households in which there is a domestic worker or a woman employed in a low-wage occupation in the service sector who has a spouse and/or children of working age (16 and over). Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg’s q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA3.3: Impact of domestic worker's reform on labor market outcomes of spouses and children

	Participation (1)	Registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Income per month (4)	Wage per hour (5)
<i>Panel A: Spouses</i>					
Spouse of Domestic worker × Reform	-0.007 (0.009)	0.002 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.013 (0.017)
Mean dependent variable	0.89	0.63	46.9	1551	8.88
R-squared	0.244	0.266	0.179	0.574	0.476
Observations	24,054	13,486	13,486	13,486	13,486
q-value	0.868	0.910	0.792	0.338	0.868
<i>Panel B: Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.027* (0.014)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.053* (0.026)	-0.015 (0.027)	0.038 (0.025)
Mean dependent variable	0.456	0.301	36.83	867.9	6.348
R-squared	0.306	0.330	0.318	0.518	0.354
Observations	31,282	8,820	8,820	8,820	8,820
q-value	0.615	0.929	0.615	0.929	0.929
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. Dependent variables in columns 3 through 5 is the natural logarithm of hours of work in the main job, income from the main job, and the hourly wage from the main job, respectively. Coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. In Panel A, the sample includes all spouses of female domestic workers and those of female workers from other blue-collar service sectors (column 1) and only those who are employed (columns 2 through 7). In Panel B, the sample includes all children of household heads aged 16 to 25 (column 1) and those who are employed (columns 2 through 5). Treated group corresponds to men (Panel A) and children (Panel B) whose spouse (mother) is a domestic worker. Comparison group correspond to men (Panel A) and children (Panel B) whose spouse (mother) is a worker in a low-wage service occupation. Mean dependent variables correspond to average for the affected group in the pre-reform period, and in the case of earnings they are expressed in Argentina Pesos of 2008. Controls include age, age squared, gender, household size, marital status, years of education of the household head, years of education of the household head squared, and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg's q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA3.4: Impact of domestic worker's reform on children's labor market outcomes

	Participation (1)	Registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Income per month (4)	Wage per hour (5)
<i>Panel A: All Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.027* (0.014)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.053* (0.026)	-0.015 (0.027)	0.038 (0.025)
Mean dependent variable	0.456	0.301	36.83	867.9	6.348
R-squared	0.306	0.330	0.318	0.518	0.354
Observations	31,282	8,820	8,820	8,820	8,820
q-value	0.615	0.929	0.615	0.929	0.929
<i>Panel B: Female Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.038** (0.017)	-0.020 (0.035)	-0.080* (0.042)	-0.012 (0.044)	0.068* (0.039)
Mean dependent variable	0.348	0.275	29.26	676	6.273
R-squared	0.235	0.359	0.312	0.520	0.345
Observations	15,382	3,269	3,269	3,269	3,269
q-value	0.438	0.929	0.695	0.929	0.891
<i>Panel C: Male Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.014 (0.021)	0.003 (0.025)	-0.030 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.049)	0.025 (0.038)
Mean dependent variable	0.562	0.317	41.58	986.7	6.389
R-squared	0.345	0.343	0.196	0.482	0.393
Observations	15,899	5,519	5,519	5,519	5,519
q-value	0.929	0.929	0.929	0.929	0.929
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. Dependent variables in columns 3 through 5 is the natural logarithm of hours of work in the main job, income from the main job, the hourly wage from the main job, income from all jobs, and total income, respectively. Coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. The sample includes all children of household heads aged 16 to 25 (column 1) and those who are employed (columns 2 through 5). Treated group corresponds to children whose mother is a domestic worker. Comparison group correspond to children whose mother is a worker in other low-wage service occupations. Mean dependent variables correspond to average for the affected group in the pre-reform period, and in the case of earnings they are expressed in Argentina Pesos of 2008. Controls include age, age squared, gender, household size, marital status, years of education of the household head, years of education of the household head squared, and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg's q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Online Appendix 4 - Results using all female low-wage workers as comparison group

The following tables replicate the analysis presented in the paper, while changing the control group to be that of women working in any low-wage occupation. In the case of spouses and children of domestic workers, the control groups correspond to men married (or living with) women working in any blue collar occupations and children of women working in any blue collar occupations, respectively.

Table OA4.1: Summary statistics

	Domestic workers	Blue-collar workers	Difference
Demographics			
Age	40.50	37.22	-3.279***
Share internal migrant	0.19	0.17	-0.020***
Share foreign migrant	0.08	0.03	-0.048***
Share married	0.45	0.47	0.024***
Household size	4.32	3.93	-0.387***
Education			
Literacy	0.99	1.00	0.006***
Ever attended school	0.99	1.00	0.006***
Complete primary school (share)	0.90	0.98	0.079***
Complete secondary school (share)	0.31	0.72	0.416***
Complete higher education (share)	0.02	0.17	0.146***
Years of education	8.91	12.03	3.125***
Work			
Hours of work per week	24.66	36.56	11.904***
Monthly income (2008 ARS)	469.56	1408.02	938.458***
Hourly wage (2008 ARS)	5.89	10.07	4.182***
Tenure (months)	49.25	41.30	-7.942***
Pension contribution	0.16	0.70	0.548***
Health insurance contribution	0.15	0.71	0.563***
Has health insurance	0.42	0.82	0.392***
Observations	19174	41261	

Note: Mean refers to the mean of the variable for the corresponding group in the pre-reform period (2010-2012). The column Difference shows the difference in the variable mean in the pre-reform period between affected and comparison groups, with stars representing the statistical significance of the difference. Domestic workers refers to female respondents who identify themselves as domestic workers. Blue-collar workers refers to female wage workers in blue collar occupations.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA4.2: Estimates of the effect of the reform on observable characteristics

	Age (1)	Internal migrant (2)	Foreign migrant (3)	Household size (4)	Married (5)	Divorced (6)	Widow (7)	Literate (8)	Attended school (9)	Primary school (10)	Secondary school (11)	Tertiary school (12)	Years of education (13)
Domestic worker \times Reform	0.003 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.008 (0.015)	0.016 (0.018)	0.032 (0.022)	0.002 (0.020)	-0.044** (0.021)	-0.027 (0.023)	-0.000 (0.020)	0.057** (0.024)	0.013 (0.015)	-0.029** (0.013)	0.016 (0.017)
Observations	111564	111564	111564	111564	111564	111564	111564	111564	111564	111564	111564	111564	111564
q-value	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.431	0.990	0.990	0.265	0.990	0.328	0.990
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Note: The table shows the difference-in-differences estimate for the standardized value of each characteristic. Internal and foreign migrant are indicators that take the value of one if the individual is an internal or foreign migrant, respectively. Married, divorced and widow are indicators that take the value of one if the respondent is married, divorced or widow, respectively. Attended school is an indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent ever attended school. Primary school, secondary school and tertiary education are indicators that takes the value of one if the respondent finished each level of education. The comparison group is composed of female wage worker in low-wage occupations. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area (MA) level. Q-value correspond Hochberg's q-values that adjust for False Discovery Rate.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA4.3: Effect of policy reform on labor market outcomes of domestic workers

	Registered (1)	Unemployed (2)	Hours of work per week on main job (3)	Underemployment (4)	Income per month from main job (5)	Wage per hour from main job (6)
Domestic worker × Reform	0.047*** (0.010)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.063*** (0.013)	0.000 (0.007)	0.023* (0.013)	0.086*** (0.013)
Mean dependent variable	0.156	0.0868	24.66	0.169	469.6	5.889
R-squared	0.416	0.100	0.269	0.095	0.583	0.444
Observations	111,564	121,242	111,564	111,564	111,564	111,564
q-value	0.000	0.975	0.000	0.975	0.230	0.000
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is unemployed. The dependent variable in column 3 is the natural logarithm of number of hours of work per week in the main job. In column 4, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent is willing to work more hours. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of income from the main job and the hourly wage from the main job, respectively. In all cases, the coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression.

The sample is composed of employed individuals, with the exception of column 2, where the sample includes all employed and unemployed individuals with a previous job. Domestic workers refers to female respondents who identify themselves as domestic workers. The comparison group is composed of female wage workers in low-wage occupations. Means of dependent variable correspond to averages for the affected group in the pre-reform period. Controls include age, age squared, migrant status, household size, literacy status, years of education, years of education squared, marital status and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg's q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA4.4: Impact of domestic worker’s reform on labor market outcomes at the household level

	Labor force participation (1)	Share registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Labor income per month (4)
Spouse of Domestic worker × Reform	-0.014** (0.006)	0.027** (0.010)	-0.006 (0.015)	0.011 (0.025)
Mean dependent variable	0.768	0.278	74.59	1698
R-squared	0.041	0.272	0.042	0.206
Observations	71,994	71,994	71,994	71,994
q-value	0.028	0.028	0.704	0.704
Controls	No	No	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32

Note: Dependent variable in column 1 is the share of individuals in the household of legal working age (16 and above) who are working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is the share of workers in the household who are registered by their employer and therefore work in the formal sector. The dependent variable in column 3 is natural logarithm of combined number of hours of work per week of all household members who are working. In column 4, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the combined labor income per month of all household members who are working. Coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. Domestic worker refers to household in which one member is a domestic worker. The sample includes all households in which there is a domestic worker or a woman employed in a low-wage occupation who has a spouse and/or children of working age (16 and over). Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg’s q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA4.5: Summary statistics of male spouses

	Spouses of domestic workers	Spouses of female workers	Difference
Demographics			
Age	45.49	42.40	-3.087***
Share internal migrant	0.22	0.23	0.010
Share foreign migrant	0.08	0.04	-0.046***
Household size	4.32	3.88	-0.440***
Has health insurance	0.52	0.81	0.292***
Education			
Literacy	0.99	1.00	0.010***
Ever attended school	0.99	1.00	0.006***
Complete primary school (share)	0.88	0.97	0.084***
Complete secondary school (share)	0.24	0.58	0.345***
Complete higher education (share)	0.02	0.15	0.127***
Years of education	8.36	11.20	2.845***
Work			
Labor force participation (share)	0.89	0.93	0.038***
Hours of work per week	46.89	45.38	-1.511***
Monthly income (2008 ARS)	1543.54	2124.04	580.503***
Hourly wage (2008 ARS)	8.87	12.67	3.802***
Pension contribution	0.63	0.81	0.184***
Health insurance contribution	0.63	0.82	0.187***

Note: Mean refers to the mean of the variable for the corresponding group in the pre-reform period (2010-2012) for spouses in the sample. The column Difference shows the difference in the variable mean in the pre-reform period between affected and comparison groups, with stars representing the statistical significance of the difference. Spouses of domestic workers refers to male respondents married to or living with of domestic workers. Spouses of female workers refers to male individuals married to or living with a wage worker in low-wage occupations.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA4.6: Summary statistics of children

	Children of domestic workers	Children of female workers	Difference
Demographics			
Age	17.84	17.79	-0.051
Gender	0.50	0.51	0.003
Share internal migrant	0.07	0.06	-0.008**
Share foreign migrant	0.01	0.01	-0.008***
Household size	5.51	4.95	-0.561***
Has health insurance	0.37	0.73	0.365***
Education			
Literacy	1.00	1.00	-0.000
Ever attended school	1.00	1.00	0.000
Complete primary school (share)	0.89	0.92	0.023***
Complete secondary school (share)	0.46	0.62	0.165***
Years of education	9.36	10.02	0.655***
Work			
Labor force participation (share)	0.32	0.25	-0.066***
Hours of work per week	36.75	36.71	-0.039
Monthly income (2008 ARS)	860.31	1090.76	220.455***
Hourly wage (2008 ARS)	6.32	7.73	1.403***
Pension contribution	0.30	0.46	0.159***
Health insurance contribution	0.30	0.47	0.167***

Note: Mean refers to the mean of the variable for the corresponding group in the pre-reform period (2010-2012) for children in the sample. The column Difference shows the difference in the variable mean in the pre-reform period between affected and comparison groups, with stars representing the statistical significance of the difference. Children of domestic workers refers to children whose mother is a domestic worker. Children of female workers refers to whose mother is a wage worker in other low-wage occupations.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA4.7: Impact of domestic worker's reform on labor market outcomes of spouses and children

	Participation (1)	Registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Income per month (4)	Wage per hour (5)
<i>Panel A: Spouses</i>					
Spouse of Domestic worker × Reform	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.014)
Mean dependent variable	0.89	0.63	46.89	1544	8.87
R-squared	0.223	0.274	0.210	0.609	0.548
Observations	50,422	30,939	30,939	30,939	30,939
q-value	0.945	0.945	0.945	0.945	0.945
<i>Panel B: Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.021** (0.009)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.026 (0.018)	0.004 (0.022)	0.030 (0.020)
Mean dependent variable	0.457	0.299	36.75	860.3	6.322
R-squared	0.309	0.337	0.301	0.514	0.380
Observations	50,363	12,961	12,961	12,961	12,961
q-value	0.325	0.854	0.854	0.854	0.854
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. Dependent variables in columns 3 through 5 is the natural logarithm of hours of work in the main job, income from the main job, and the hourly wage from the main job, respectively. Coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. In Panel A, the sample includes all spouses of female domestic workers and those of female workers from other low-wage occupations (column 1) and only those who are employed (columns 2 through 7). In Panel B, the sample includes all children of household heads aged 16 to 25 (column 1) and those who are employed (columns 2 through 5). Treated group corresponds to men (Panel A) and children (Panel B) whose spouse (mother) is a domestic worker. Comparison group correspond to men (Panel A) and children (Panel B) whose spouse (mother) is a worker in a low-wage occupation. Mean dependent variables correspond to average for the affected group in the pre-reform period, and in the case of earnings they are expressed in Argentina Pesos of 2008. Controls include age, age squared, gender, household size, marital status, years of education of the household head, years of education of the household head squared, and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg's q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA4.8: Impact of domestic worker's reform on children's labor market outcomes


	Participation (1)	Registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Income per month (4)	Wage per hour (5)
<i>Panel A: All Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.021** (0.009)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.026 (0.018)	0.004 (0.022)	0.030 (0.020)
Mean dependent variable	0.457	0.299	36.75	860.3	6.322
R-squared	0.309	0.337	0.301	0.514	0.380
Observations	50,363	12,961	12,961	12,961	12,961
q-value	0.325	0.854	0.854	0.854	0.854
<i>Panel B: Female Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.031** (0.013)	0.004 (0.020)	-0.052 (0.040)	-0.008 (0.034)	0.044 (0.031)
Mean dependent variable	0.347	0.278	29.05	673.1	6.307
R-squared	0.244	0.374	0.300	0.525	0.374
Observations	24,612	4,812	4,812	4,812	4,812
q-value	0.286	0.854	0.854	0.854	0.854
<i>Panel C: Male Children</i>					
Child of Domestic Worker × Reform	-0.010 (0.014)	0.012 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.022)	0.019 (0.031)	0.029 (0.026)
Mean dependent variable	0.563	0.311	41.53	974.4	6.321
R-squared	0.356	0.346	0.205	0.485	0.411
Observations	25,738	8,089	8,089	8,089	8,089
q-value	0.854	0.854	0.854	0.854	0.854
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. Dependent variables in columns 3 through 5 is the natural logarithm of hours of work in the main job, income from the main job, the hourly wage from the main job, income from all jobs, and total income, respectively. Coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. The sample includes all children of household heads aged 16 to 25 (column 1) and those who are employed (columns 2 through 5). Treated group corresponds to children whose mother is a domestic worker. Comparison group correspond to children whose mother is a worker in other low-wage occupations. Mean dependent variables correspond to average for the affected group in the pre-reform period, and in the case of earnings they are expressed in Argentina Pesos of 2008. Controls include age, age squared, gender, household size, marital status, years of education of the household head, years of education of the household head squared, and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg's q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Online Appendix 5 - Checks for the assumption of stability of group composition

The following graphs and tables test for changes in the composition of treatment and comparison groups after the reform to domestic workers' labor regulations. First I plot the share (Figure OA5.1) and number (Figure OA5.2) of workers surveyed who are employed in each occupation. In both cases it can be seen that the composition of each group remains stable over time.


Figure OA5.1: Share of workers by occupation



Note: The Figure shows the share of domestic workers and of workers in each occupation of the service sector for every wave in which the survey was conducted. Occupation is self-reported by survey respondents.

In addition in Table OA5.1 I present the estimates of regressing an indicator that takes the value of one for domestic workers (and zero otherwise) among the sample of workers of interest (women employed or unemployed with a previous job as either a domestic worker or a low-wage worker in the service sector). Following the reform, the share of domestic workers among the sample under study increased by 1 percentage point. This represents a 1.4% increase with respect to the share of domestic workers among this group before the reform (64.4%).

Figure OA5.2: Number of workers by occupation



Note: The Figure shows the number of domestic workers and of workers in each occupation of the service sector for every wave in which the survey was conducted. Occupation is self-reported by survey respondents.

Even if all these new domestic workers were registered, this would account for no more than a quarter of the effect that I find regarding the change in formality rates. Given that the observable characteristics of domestic workers after the reform is not different from those prior to the policy change, it is likely that the incidence of this compositional change is even smaller.

I also take advantage of the rotating panel structure of the data to create transition matrices of the probability that a person is a domestic worker given their status in the labor force and their occupation in the previous year. These transition probabilities are presented in Table OA5.2, showing no changes in the probability that a person is employed as a domestic worker after the reform.

Finally, another way in which the composition of workers may change is if the reform led employers to hire domestic workers. Even though in the main paper I found that this is not the case, Table OA5.3 presents the estimates when the sample includes employed individuals as well as those unemployed with a previous job. Here, I assume they are not registered and that they have zero labor income and zero hours of work. As it can be seen, the results do not significantly differ from

Table OA5.1: Likelihood of being a domestic worker after the reform

	Employed (1)	Employed & unemployed with previous job (2)
Reform	0.009** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
Mean dependent variable	0.644	0.643
R-squared	0.910	0.905
Observations	54,963	60,394
Controls	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual considers herself a domestic worker. The sample in column 1 is composed of women employed at the time of the survey either as a domestic worker or as a blue collar worker in the service sector, and in column 2 the sample also includes all unemployed women whose previous job was either domestic work or a blue collar job in the service sector. In both cases, the coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. Mean dependent variable corresponds to the share of domestic workers in the sample in the pre-reform period. Controls include age, age squared, migrant status, household size, literacy status, years of education, years of education squared, marital status and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

those presented in Table 3 of the main paper.

Table OA5.2: Share of individuals employed as domestic workers each year by occupation and labor force status in the previous year.

Year	Domestic worker	Female service worker	Inactive
2011	0.901	0.136	0.386
2012	0.904	0.147	0.405
2013	0.906	0.111	0.372
2014	0.920	0.134	0.375
2015	0.903	0.152	0.414

Note: The table shows, for each year, the proportion of female wage workers who are employed as domestic workers, depending on their occupation and labor force participation status in the previous year. Female service worker refers to women employed in blue-collar occupations in the service sector.

Table OA5.3: Effect of policy reform on labor market outcomes of domestic workers including the unemployed

	Registered (1)	Hours of work per week on main job (2)	Underemployment (3)	Income per month from main job (4)	Wage per hour from main job (5)
Domestic worker × Reform	0.044*** (0.010)	-0.047** (0.023)	0.003 (0.009)	0.033 (0.040)	0.079*** (0.017)
Mean dependent variable	0.143	24.66	0.241	469.6	5.889
R-squared	0.302	0.160	0.133	0.178	0.232
Observations	60,394	60,394	60,394	60,394	60,394
q-value	0.000	0.121	0.759	0.759	0.000
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. The dependent variable in column 2 is the natural logarithm of number of hours of work per week in the main job. In column 3, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent is willing to work more hours. In columns 4 and 5, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of income from the main job and the hourly wage from the main job, respectively. In all cases, the coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression.

The sample is composed of employed and unemployed individuals with a previous job. Domestic workers refers to female respondents who identify themselves as domestic workers or who were previously employed as domestic workers and are currently unemployed. The comparison group is composed of female wage workers in low-wage service occupations or unemployed women with a previous job in a low-wage service occupation. Means of dependent variable correspond to averages for the affected group in the pre-reform period. Controls include age, age squared, migrant status, household size, literacy status, years of education, years of education squared, marital status and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. Q-value corresponds to Hochberg's q-value to adjust for False Discovery Rate.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Online Appendix 6 - Estimates using yearly interactions

The following tables replicate the results in Tables 2 to 5 of the paper using the following specification:

$$Y_{ijkt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DW_{ijkt} + \sum_{t=2009}^{2015} \beta_t DW_{ijkt} \times I[Year = t] + \Gamma X_{ijkt} + \theta_t + \nu_j + \mu_k + \varepsilon_{ijkt} \quad (3)$$

The omitted category is always the year 2012, the year prior to the introduction of the reforms. It should be noted that p-values reported in these tables have not been corrected for multiple hypothesis testing.

Table OA6.1: Effect of policy reform on labor market outcomes of domestic workers

	Registered (1)	Unemployed (2)	Hours of work per week on main job (3)	Underemployment (4)	Income per month from main job (5)	Wage per hour from main job (6)
2010 × Domestic worker	0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.015 (0.019)	0.000 (0.009)	0.038* (0.020)	0.023 (0.020)
2011 × Domestic worker	-0.002 (0.012)	0.002 (0.008)	0.004 (0.017)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.017)
2013 × Domestic worker	0.031* (0.017)	-0.000 (0.009)	-0.029 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.029 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.019)
2014 × Domestic worker	0.061*** (0.017)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.054*** (0.017)	0.004 (0.012)	0.051*** (0.018)	0.106*** (0.020)
2015 × Domestic worker	0.069*** (0.023)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.034 (0.028)	0.009 (0.015)	0.061* (0.031)	0.095*** (0.026)
Domestic worker	-0.298*** (0.032)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.287*** (0.045)	0.081*** (0.018)	-0.501*** (0.032)	-0.214*** (0.029)
Constant	-0.041 (0.059)	0.372*** (0.033)	2.807*** (0.073)	0.273*** (0.021)	5.340*** (0.067)	1.147*** (0.058)
R-squared	0.315	0.093	0.201	0.087	0.432	0.306
Observations	54,963	60,394	54,963	54,963	54,963	54,963
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is unemployed. The dependent variable in column 3 is the natural logarithm of number of hours of work per week in the main job. In column 4, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent is willing to work more hours. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of income from the main job and the hourly wage from the main job, respectively.

The sample is composed of employed individuals, with the exception of column 2, where the sample includes all employed and unemployed individuals with a previous job. Domestic workers refers to female respondents who identify themselves as domestic workers. The comparison group is composed of female wage workers in low-wage service occupations. Controls include age, age squared, migrant status, household size, literacy status, years of education, years of education squared, marital status and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA6.2: Impact of domestic worker's reform on labor market outcomes at the household level

	Labor force participation (1)	Share registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Labor income per month (4)
2010 × Domestic worker	0.011 (0.012)	0.024 (0.017)	0.055* (0.032)	-0.008 (0.038)
2011 × Domestic worker	0.013* (0.007)	0.007 (0.016)	0.033 (0.026)	-0.015 (0.034)
2013 × Domestic worker	0.002 (0.008)	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.026)	0.017 (0.032)
2014 × Domestic worker	0.001 (0.011)	0.041** (0.018)	0.035 (0.025)	0.019 (0.038)
2015 × Domestic worker	-0.008 (0.012)	0.059*** (0.021)	-0.019 (0.032)	0.005 (0.044)
Domestic worker	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.352*** (0.017)	-0.250*** (0.027)	-0.451*** (0.028)
Constant	0.764*** (0.003)	0.624*** (0.007)	4.277*** (0.012)	7.529*** (0.016)
R-squared	0.038	0.208	0.036	0.134
Observations	36,194	36,194	36,194	36,194
Controls	No	No	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32

Note: Dependent variable in column 1 is the share of individuals in the household of legal working age (16 and above) who are working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is the share of workers in the household who are registered by their employer and therefore work in the formal sector. The dependent variable in column 3 is natural logarithm of combined number of hours of work per week of all household members who are working. In column 4, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the combined labor income per month of all household members who are working. Domestic worker refers to household in which one member is a domestic worker. The sample includes all households in which there is a domestic worker or a woman employed in a low-wage occupation in the service sector who has a spouse and/or children of working age (16 and over). Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA6.3: Impact of domestic worker's reform on labor market outcomes of spouses of domestic workers

	Participation (1)	Registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Income per month (4)	Wage per hour (5)
2010 × Spouse of domestic worker	0.021* (0.012)	0.008 (0.026)	0.021 (0.023)	-0.043 (0.029)	-0.064* (0.035)
2011 × Spouse of domestic worker	0.017 (0.012)	0.002 (0.020)	0.024 (0.020)	-0.029 (0.028)	-0.053* (0.031)
2013 × Spouse of domestic worker	0.006 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.024)	0.039** (0.016)	-0.015 (0.025)	-0.055** (0.025)
2014 × Spouse of domestic worker	-0.000 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.027)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.029)	-0.070** (0.027)
2015 × Spouse of domestic worker	0.008 (0.014)	0.056** (0.024)	-0.029 (0.023)	-0.071*** (0.025)	-0.042 (0.027)
Spouse of domestic worker	0.005 (0.014)	0.022 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.030)	0.039 (0.038)	0.067** (0.026)
Constant	0.637*** (0.040)	-0.145* (0.073)	3.660*** (0.090)	5.651*** (0.093)	0.605*** (0.077)
R-squared	0.243	0.265	0.178	0.570	0.474
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. Dependent variables in columns 3 through 5 is the natural logarithm of hours of work in the main job, income from the main job, and the hourly wage from the main job, respectively. The sample includes all spouses of female domestic workers and those of female workers from other blue-collar service sectors (column 1) and only those who are employed (columns 2 through 7). The comparison group correspond to men whose spouse is a worker in a low-wage service occupation. Controls include age, age squared, gender, household size, marital status, years of education, and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA6.4: Impact of domestic worker's reform on children's labor market outcomes

	Participation (1)	Formality (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Income per month (4)	Wage per hour (5)
2010 × Child of domestic worker	0.015 (0.018)	0.036 (0.031)	0.045 (0.040)	0.060* (0.031)	0.015 (0.034)
2011 × Child of domestic worker	0.037* (0.019)	0.022 (0.030)	0.033 (0.040)	0.051 (0.035)	0.019 (0.033)
2013 × Child of domestic worker	-0.030* (0.016)	-0.009 (0.023)	0.010 (0.055)	0.045 (0.044)	0.035 (0.043)
2014 × Child of domestic worker	-0.017 (0.022)	0.047* (0.027)	-0.014 (0.039)	0.048 (0.037)	0.062* (0.034)
2015 × Child of domestic worker	0.015 (0.024)	0.021 (0.043)	-0.045 (0.046)	0.009 (0.052)	0.054 (0.048)
Child of domestic worker	0.066*** (0.019)	-0.026 (0.036)	-0.025 (0.036)	-0.043 (0.044)	-0.018 (0.043)
Constant	-1.323*** (0.048)	-0.520*** (0.067)	2.301*** (0.080)	4.361*** (0.112)	0.674*** (0.091)
R-squared	0.305	0.329	0.316	0.516	0.353
Observations	31,282	8,820	8,820	8,820	8,820
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. Dependent variables in columns 3 through 5 is the natural logarithm of hours of work in the main job, income from the main job, and hourly wage from the main job, respectively. The sample includes all children of household heads aged 16 to 25 (column 1) and those who are employed (columns 2 through 7). Treated group corresponds to children whose mother is a domestic worker. Comparison group correspond to children whose mother is a low-wage worker in a service occupation. Controls include age, age squared, gender, household size, marital status, years of education of the household head, years of education of the household head squared, and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA6.5: Impact of domestic worker's reform on female children's labor market outcomes

	Participation (1)	Formality (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Income per month (4)	Wage per hour (5)
2010 × Child of domestic worker	-0.017 (0.026)	0.001 (0.043)	0.086 (0.058)	0.056 (0.065)	-0.030 (0.068)
2011 × Child of domestic worker	0.062** (0.025)	0.007 (0.047)	0.111 (0.071)	0.063 (0.072)	-0.047 (0.079)
2013 × Child of domestic worker	-0.051** (0.024)	-0.052 (0.044)	0.059 (0.092)	0.104 (0.068)	0.045 (0.084)
2014 × Child of domestic worker	-0.025 (0.026)	0.025 (0.059)	0.004 (0.073)	0.052 (0.074)	0.048 (0.063)
2015 × Child of domestic worker	0.027 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.054)	-0.087 (0.063)	-0.072 (0.087)	0.014 (0.088)
Child of domestic worker	0.075*** (0.024)	0.007 (0.090)	-0.058 (0.061)	-0.115 (0.098)	-0.057 (0.082)
Constant	-1.075*** (0.077)	-0.439*** (0.104)	1.793*** (0.228)	4.221*** (0.232)	1.041*** (0.150)
R-squared	0.234	0.358	0.307	0.514	0.340
Observations	15,382	3,269	3,269	3,269	3,269
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. Dependent variables in columns 3 through 5 is the natural logarithm of hours of work in the main job, income from the main job, and hourly wage from the main job, respectively. The sample includes all female children of household heads aged 16 to 25 (column 1) and those who are employed (columns 2 through 7). Treated group corresponds to children whose mother is a domestic worker. Comparison group correspond to children whose mother is a low-wage worker in a service occupation. Controls include age, age squared, gender, household size, marital status, years of education of the household head, years of education of the household head squared, and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA6.6: Impact of domestic worker's reform on male children's labor market outcomes

	Participation (1)	Formality (2)	Hours of work per week (3)	Income per month (4)	Wage per hour (5)
2010 × Child of domestic worker	0.046 (0.029)	0.050 (0.050)	0.005 (0.043)	0.049 (0.033)	0.044 (0.039)
2011 × Child of domestic worker	0.018 (0.029)	0.038 (0.043)	-0.016 (0.045)	0.043 (0.049)	0.059 (0.038)
2013 × Child of domestic worker	-0.006 (0.024)	0.020 (0.037)	-0.022 (0.057)	0.006 (0.059)	0.028 (0.049)
2014 × Child of domestic worker	-0.006 (0.033)	0.053 (0.037)	-0.032 (0.045)	0.047 (0.059)	0.078 (0.051)
2015 × Child of domestic worker	0.006 (0.032)	0.034 (0.077)	-0.010 (0.060)	0.068 (0.081)	0.077 (0.070)
Child of domestic worker	0.056* (0.031)	-0.052 (0.037)	0.004 (0.052)	0.009 (0.083)	0.005 (0.065)
Constant	-1.339*** (0.052)	-0.545*** (0.088)	2.750*** (0.104)	4.551*** (0.121)	0.415*** (0.121)
R-squared	0.344	0.339	0.194	0.480	0.391
Observations	15,899	5,519	5,519	5,519	5,519
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32

Note: In column 1, dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. Dependent variables in columns 3 through 5 is the natural logarithm of hours of work in the main job, income from the main job, and hourly wage from the main job, respectively. The sample includes all male children of household heads aged 16 to 25 (column 1) and those who are employed (columns 2 through 7). Treated group corresponds to children whose mother is a domestic worker. Comparison group correspond to children whose mother is a low-wage worker in a service occupation. Controls include age, age squared, gender, household size, marital status, years of education of the household head, years of education of the household head squared, and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Online Appendix 7 - Additional robustness checks and treatment effect heterogeneity

In this Appendix, I present additional checks to address the concern that the results shown in the paper may be driven by something other than the reform to domestic workers' labor standards.

One potential confounder is economic growth. Even though during most of the period of analysis GDP growth alternated years of expansion and contraction with an almost net zero growth (World Bank, 2021), I cannot discard that growth was uneven across the population. Although I do not have earnings data from employers, it is safe to assume that earnings of domestic workers correlate positively with those of their employers. Hence, in Table OA7.1 I show estimates of the effects for each decile of labor earnings. Because the distribution of earnings is different across treatment and comparison groups and earnings evolved differently across groups after the reform, I create deciles of income using the distribution of earnings of domestic workers in the pre-reform period. I then assign non-domestic workers and domestic workers in the post-reform period to these deciles based on the reported income.

In Table OA7.2 I perform a similar exercise dividing workers in deciles according to their hours of work. Like before, domestic workers employed the longest were more likely to become registered, and they were also more likely to experience an increase in monthly earnings and wages per hour.

The results show that the increase in formality rates and reduction in hours of work were mostly concentrated among domestic workers with earnings and work hours above the median. If the effects found among domestic workers were the consequence of improvements in economic conditions, and this improvement benefited high-income employers, one would not expect the reduction of hours of work to be higher for those domestic workers earning higher wages. Instead, it seems more plausible that the reduction in hours of work was the way employers subject to higher enforcement used to reduce the higher cost of compliance with the labor regulations.

As an alternative specification, in Table OA7.3 I estimate quantile treatment effects among

Table OA7.1: Effect of policy reform by earnings deciles

	Registered (1)	Hours of work per week (2)	Underemployment (3)
Decile 1	0.021 (0.017)	-0.03 (0.091)	0.05 (0.051)
Decile 2	-0.065* (0.036)	-0.041 (0.072)	0.107** (0.041)
Decile 3	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.073 (0.064)	0.007 (0.047)
Decile 4	-0.024 (0.026)	-0.116 (0.075)	-0.024 (0.039)
Decile 5	0.053 (0.035)	-0.185*** (0.060)	0.081*** (0.029)
Decile 6	-0.017 (0.037)	-0.208*** (0.049)	0.018 (0.029)
Decile 7	0.074** (0.031)	-0.129*** (0.043)	-0.008 (0.021)
Decile 8	0.081** (0.034)	-0.163*** (0.030)	-0.015 (0.020)
Decile 9	-0.006 (0.034)	-0.166*** (0.026)	0.049*** (0.013)
Decile 10	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.220*** (0.029)	0.018* (0.010)
Observations	54,918	54,918	54,918
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32

Note: The table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of each outcome for the corresponding decile of individual earnings. Deciles are determined according to the distribution of earnings of domestic workers in the pre-reform period. Dependent variable in column 1 is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. In column 2, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of number of hours of work per week in the main job. The dependent variable in column 3 is an indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent is willing to work more hours. The sample is composed of employed women who identify themselves as domestic workers or who are employed in low-wage service occupations. Controls include age, age squared, migrant status, household size, literacy status, years of education, years of education squared, marital status and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

domestic workers using the changes-in-changes model proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006). This model uses the change experienced by the comparison group across time at each decile of the pre-reform period to construct a counterfactual distribution for the affected group in the absence of the policy.

An additional confounder could come from the introduction of additional policies that might

Table OA7.2: Effect of policy reform by deciles of hours of work

	Registered (1)	Income per month from main job (2)	Wage per hour from main job (3)
Decile 1	0.033 (0.032)	0.008 (0.083)	0.014 (0.076)
Decile 2	-0.002 (0.030)	0.016 (0.051)	0.019 (0.052)
Decile 3	0 (0.029)	0.035 (0.057)	0.054 (0.057)
Decile 4	0.103*** (0.037)	0.098 (0.076)	0.094 (0.076)
Decile 5	0.066* (0.034)	0.029 (0.044)	0.029 (0.044)
Decile 6	0.109*** (0.026)	0.116*** (0.029)	0.114*** (0.029)
Decile 7	0.061*** (0.022)	0.071** (0.030)	0.072** (0.030)
Decile 8	0.112*** (0.032)	0.159*** (0.038)	0.162*** (0.039)
Decile 9	0.072*** (0.017)	0.088*** (0.020)	0.098*** (0.020)
Decile 10	0.085** (0.032)	-0.001 (0.033)	-0.01 (0.038)
Observations	54,918	54,918	54,918
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32

Note: The table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of each outcome for the corresponding decile of individual hours of work. Deciles are determined according to the distribution of income of domestic workers in the pre-reform period. Dependent variable in column 1 is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. In column 2, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of income per month from the main job. The dependent variable in column 3 is the natural logarithm of the wage per hour in the main job. The sample is composed of employed women who identify themselves as domestic workers or who are employed in low-wage service occupations. Controls include age, age squared, migrant status, household size, literacy status, years of education, years of education squared, marital status and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

affect domestic workers in a different way as other workers. One such policy is the Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (*Asignación Universal por Hijo* or AUH), a conditional cash transfer program introduced in the October 2009. To be eligible, both parents of children aged 18 or less had to be unemployed or work in the informal sector. An amendment introduced a month after its creation made domestic workers earning less than the minimum wage eligible to receive

Table OA7.3: Labor market effects of policy reform - Quantile Treatment Effects

Quantile	Hours of work per week on main job (1)	Income per month from main job (2)	Wage per hour from main job (3)
10	-0.007 (0.027)	0.012 (0.024)	0.065*** (0.016)
20	0.006 (0.022)	0.032* (0.018)	0.068*** (0.013)
30	0.012 (0.020)	0.046*** (0.016)	0.077*** (0.013)
40	-0.009 (0.019)	0.066*** (0.013)	0.078*** (0.010)
50	-0.022 (0.017)	0.072*** (0.012)	0.081*** (0.010)
60	-0.042*** (0.015)	0.061*** (0.013)	0.086*** (0.010)
70	-0.049*** (0.015)	0.035*** (0.012)	0.084*** (0.011)
80	-0.043*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.012)	0.098*** (0.011)
90	-0.048*** (0.016)	0.052*** (0.014)	0.103*** (0.016)
Mean	-0.021 (0.014)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.081*** (0.009)
Observations	54,963	54,963	54,963
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Estimates correspond to the treatment effect for the each quantile in the Changes-in-changes model (Athey and Imbens, 2006). Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of hours of work per week in the main job (column 1), the monthly income from the main job (column 2), and the hourly wage in the main job (column 3). Controls include age, migrant status, household size, literacy status, years of education, marital status and decile of per-capita family income. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

the transfer regardless of registration status, creating differential incentives to work in the formal sector between domestic workers and other wage workers with children.

While the survey does not have information about AUH beneficiaries, to analyze the extent of this concern, Table OA7.4 presents the results separately for women who have children aged 18 or below and so might be eligible for the program (Panel A), and those with no children under the age of 18 (Panel B).¹ The only difference across groups can be found in the likelihood of being registered, which is lower for domestic workers with children. Although puzzling, it is possible that that domestic workers, unaware of their eligibility regardless of registration status, asked their

¹Garganta et al. (2017) show that the transfer did not increase the proportion of new mothers.

employers to not be registered. On the other hand, the fact that the impact of the reform on other outcomes is similar for workers with and without children may indicate that the reform improved the bargaining power of domestic workers.

Table OA7.4: Effect of policy reform on labor market outcomes of domestic workers with and without children

	Registered (1)	Unemployed (2)	Hours of work per week on main job (3)	Underemployment (4)	Income per month from main job (5)	Wage per hour from main job (6)
<i>Panel A: With children</i>						
Domestic worker × Reform	0.032** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.042** (0.016)	0.006 (0.008)	0.040** (0.019)	0.082*** (0.018)
Mean dependent variable	0.127	0.0979	23.16	0.189	437.2	5.837
R-squared	0.332	0.093	0.218	0.091	0.441	0.313
Observations	36,542	40,497	36,542	36,542	36,542	36,542
<i>Panel B: Without children</i>						
Domestic worker × Reform	0.082*** (0.020)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.053** (0.020)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.036* (0.020)	0.089*** (0.018)
Mean dependent variable	0.213	0.0647	27.55	0.128	531.9	5.988
R-squared	0.287	0.104	0.182	0.076	0.435	0.322
Observations	18,413	19,889	18,413	18,413	18,413	18,413
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32

Note: Panel A shows the results for women who have children aged 18 or less and could thus eligible for the program. Panel B report results for women who do not have children aged 18 or less, and hence are not eligible for the Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (AUH) program. In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the individual reports their employer makes contributions to the pension system. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the individual is unemployed. The dependent variable in column 3 is the natural logarithm of number of hours of work per week in the main job. In column 4, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent is willing to work more hours. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of income from the main job and the hourly wage from the main job, respectively. In all cases, the coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from an OLS regression. The sample is composed of employed individuals, with the exception of column 2, where the sample includes all employed and unemployed individuals with a previous job. Domestic workers refers to female respondents who identify themselves as domestic workers. The comparison group is composed of female wage workers in low-wage service occupations. Means of dependent variable correspond to averages for the affected group in the pre-reform period. Controls include age, age squared, migrant status, household size, literacy status, years of education, years of education squared, marital status and decile of per-capita family income. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Online Appendix 8 - Additional tables and figures of household-level analysis

Tables [OA8.1](#) and [OA8.2](#) present summary statistics for the sample of spouses and children (respectively) included in the analysis. While differences between spouses of treatment and comparison women are similar to those observed between domestic workers and female workers in low-wage occupations in the service sector, the differences between children of treatment and comparison women are neither as pervasive nor large.

In Tables [OA8.3](#) and [OA8.4](#), I show the effect of the reform on the main outcomes at the household level, for each decile of total household earnings and hours of work, respectively.² The sample includes all households in which there is a domestic worker or a woman employed in a low-wage occupation in the service sector living with their spouse, children of working age (16 and over) or both.

There is large heterogeneity in outcomes across deciles. Reductions in labor force participation are high below the median of the distributions of income and hours, probably reflecting the fact that those dropping out are individuals with low attachment to the labor market. Because this changes the composition of workers across groups, the interpretation of other outcomes becomes challenging.

Increases in formality rates are higher in the center of both distributions, and reductions in hours of work seem to be higher among those at the bottom and top deciles of household income, although estimates are noisy. Finally, the increase in household earnings seems to be driven by households at or below decile 6 of the distribution of hours of work, suggesting the reform may have mostly benefited lower-income households.

²Because outcomes are different in levels across treatment and comparison groups, I define deciles of household income (hours of work) according to its distribution among treated households in the pre-reform period.

Table OA8.1: Summary statistics of male spouses

	Spouses of domestic workers	Spouses of female service workers	Difference
Demographics			
Age	45.49	43.83	-1.663***
Share internal migrant	0.22	0.25	0.035***
Share foreign migrant	0.08	0.05	-0.029***
Household size	4.32	4.28	-0.033
Has health insurance	0.52	0.70	0.182***
Education			
Literacy	0.99	1.00	0.007***
Ever attended school	0.99	1.00	0.003*
Complete primary school (share)	0.88	0.93	0.044***
Complete secondary school (share)	0.24	0.33	0.091***
Complete higher education (share)	0.02	0.04	0.021***
Years of education	8.36	9.24	0.883***
Work			
Labor force participation (share)	0.89	0.90	0.015**
Hours of work per week	46.90	46.44	-0.458
Monthly income (2008 ARS)	1540.61	1752.54	211.924***
Hourly wage (2008 ARS)	8.83	10.36	1.532***
Pension contribution	0.63	0.72	0.091***
Health insurance contribution	0.63	0.72	0.092***

Note: Mean refers to the mean of the variable for the corresponding group in the pre-reform period (2010-2012) for spouses in the sample. The column Difference shows the difference in the variable mean in the pre-reform period between affected and comparison groups, with stars representing the statistical significance of the difference. Spouses of domestic workers refers to male respondents married to or living with of domestic workers. Spouses of female service workers refers to male individuals married to or living with a wage worker in blue collar service occupations.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA8.2: Summary statistics of children

	Children of domestic workers	Children of female service workers	Difference
Demographics			
Age	17.84	17.83	-0.011
Gender	0.50	0.51	0.002
Share internal migrant	0.07	0.07	0.002
Share foreign migrant	0.01	0.01	-0.005***
Household size	5.51	5.33	-0.183***
Has health insurance	0.37	0.61	0.245***
Education			
Literacy	1.00	1.00	-0.001
Ever attended school	1.00	1.00	-0.000
Complete primary school (share)	0.89	0.91	0.013**
Complete secondary school (share)	0.46	0.50	0.044***
Years of education	9.36	9.53	0.167***
Work			
Labor force participation (share)	0.32	0.29	-0.030***
Hours of work per week	36.76	36.85	0.090
Monthly income (2008 ARS)	860.10	999.61	139.51***
Hourly wage (2008 ARS)	6.32	7.20	0.885***
Pension contribution	0.30	0.39	0.095***
Health insurance contribution	0.30	0.40	0.105***

Note: Mean refers to the mean of the variable for the corresponding group in the pre-reform period (2010-2012) for children in the sample. The column Difference shows the difference in the variable mean in the pre-reform period between affected and comparison groups, with stars representing the statistical significance of the difference. Children of domestic workers refers to children whose mother is a domestic worker. Children of female service workers refers to whose mother is a wage worker in low-wage service occupations.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA8.3: Household level effects of policy reform by decile of household earnings

	Labor force participation (1)	Share registered (2)	Hours of work per week (3)
Decile 1	-0.03 (0.033)	0.018 (0.031)	-0.22 (0.138)
Decile 2	0.029 (0.045)	-0.003 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.122)
Decile 3	-0.036 (0.028)	0.095* (0.056)	-0.015 (0.064)
Decile 4	-0.031 (0.023)	0.037 (0.049)	-0.022 (0.047)
Decile 5	-0.070** (0.029)	0.109*** (0.038)	0.021 (0.058)
Decile 6	-0.004 (0.016)	0.044 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.043)
Decile 7	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.029)	0.005 (0.032)
Decile 8	0.007 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.030)
Decile 9	0.008 (0.010)	0.042** (0.019)	-0.044 (0.028)
Decile 10	0.009 (0.013)	0.015 (0.017)	0.004 (0.026)
Observations	36,194	36,194	36,194
Controls	No	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	No	No
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32

Note: The table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of each outcome for the corresponding decile of household earnings. Deciles are determined according to the distribution of household earnings of the treated group in the pre-reform period. Dependent variable in column 1 is the share of individuals in the household of legal working age (16 and above) who are working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is the share of workers in the household who are registered by their employer and therefore work in the formal sector. The dependent variable in column 3 is natural logarithm of combined number of hours of work per week of all household members who are working. The sample includes all households in which there is a domestic worker or a woman employed in a low-wage occupation in the service sector living with their spouse, children of working age (16 and over) or both. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA8.4: Household level effects of policy reform by decile of household hours of work

	Labor force participation (1)	Share registered (2)	Labor income per month (3)
Decile 1	-0.099*** (0.030)	-0.045 (0.059)	-0.189 (0.120)
Decile 2	-0.063** (0.024)	0.07 (0.061)	0.055 (0.076)
Decile 3	0.009 (0.015)	0.068** (0.031)	0.098 (0.064)
Decile 4	0.004 (0.023)	0.05 (0.038)	0.035 (0.051)
Decile 5	-0.03 (0.019)	0.048 (0.030)	-0.071 (0.072)
Decile 6	-0.012 (0.019)	0.067** (0.029)	0.120** (0.055)
Decile 7	-0.011 (0.013)	0.009 (0.029)	0.012 (0.052)
Decile 8	0.007 (0.017)	0.032* (0.018)	0.02 (0.037)
Decile 9	0.002 (0.009)	0.028 (0.019)	0.07 (0.047)
Decile 10	0.007 (0.010)	0.01 (0.025)	-0.006 (0.042)
Observations	36,194	36,194	36,194
Controls	No	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects	No	No	No
MA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of clusters	32	32	32

Note: The table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of each outcome for the corresponding decile of household income. Deciles are determined according to the distribution of household income of the treated group in the pre-reform period. Dependent variable in column 1 is the share of individuals in the household of legal working age (16 and above) who are working or looking for a job. In column 2, the dependent variable is the share of workers in the household who are registered by their employer and therefore work in the formal sector. In column 3, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the combined labor income per month of all household members who are working. The sample includes all households in which there is a domestic worker or a woman employed in a low-wage occupation in the service sector living with their spouse, children of working age (16 and over) or both. Standard errors clustered at the Metropolitan Area level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1